Think Like a Builder

When a project moves outside your knowledge base, knowing when to bring in help is the mark of a smart builder.

0
Lowell Farrand spent years serving as an FAA DAR and is in the EAA Hall of Fame. He offers sound advise to builders. [Credit: Bill Wilson]
Lowell Farrand spent years serving as an FAA DAR and is in the EAA Hall of Fame. He offers sound advise to builders. [Credit: Bill Wilson]

If you want to understand what happens when people stop thinking like builders, look no further than Boeing.

In recent years, what was once one of America’s flagship engineering companies has endured public setbacks and bruising scrutiny. Its Boeing Starliner program—developed in partnership with Lockheed Martin—suffered technical and management failures serious enough to strand astronauts in orbit and trigger a top-level mishap investigation. The Wall Street Journal quoted Jared Issacman, NASA’s new leader as saying, “The most troubling failure revealed by this investigation is not hardware, it’s decision-making and leadership that, if left unchecked, could create a culture incompatible with human spaceflight.”

NASA classified the Starliner problems as a “Type A” mishap—the most serious category. The agency’s investigation concluded that the most troubling failures were breakdowns in systems engineering, integration, decision-making, and leadership. In other words, the problem wasn’t with the metal. It was judgment.

That distinction matters. Because while few of us are building spacecraft, many of us are building airplanes. And the principle is the same.

The Illusion of Simplicity

Modern kit aircraft are marvels of refinement. Matched-hole drilling. Complete hardware packages. Improved plans. Sophisticated avionics. Entire firewall-forward packages shipped in crates.

It would be easy to assume that much of the “thinking” has been engineered out of the process.

It hasn’t.

What has changed is not the need for disciplined judgment—but where it applies.

Today’s builder may not fabricate every bracket from raw stock, but he or she must still make hundreds—often thousands—of decisions:

Is this the correct fastener? Is the torque appropriate? Is the hardware oriented correctly? Is the edge distance sufficient?

Is the wiring properly supported and protected?

Are the controls rigged and balanced correctly? Has this been independently verified before closing it up?

Matched holes reduce fabrication uncertainty. They do not reduce responsibility.

The airplane does not care whether the holes were pre-drilled.

Where Builders Get Into Trouble

Ask someone who has inspected hundreds of amateur-built aircraft.

Lowell Farrand, an inductee in the Experimental Aircraft Association Hall of Fame and recipient of the Tony Bengelis Award, spent years serving as an FAA Designated Airworthiness Representative in the Midwest. His experience offers a clear pattern.

The most common issue?

Builders rushing to completion.

Typical errors spawned in haste are fasteners used incorrectly—or left out entirely; hardware errors in critical flight control components; improperly balanced control surfaces. There are avionics wiring deficiencies and firewall-forward discrepancies.

Most of these mistakes are not failures of kit design, but failures of decision-making under time pressure. The final stretch of a project is emotionally charged. The airplane looks finished. The panel is in place. The engine is hung. Friends are asking when it will fly. That is precisely when builder discipline must increase—not decrease.

Cognitive Load Does Not Disappear—It Shifts

First-time builders face total novelty. Every page of plans introduces something unfamiliar. However, even experienced builders are not immune. For instance, a builder might experience increased pressure from switching from aluminum fabrication to composite, or from carbureted to fuel-injected engines; from analog “steam gauges” to glass panels. Familiarity in one domain can create overconfidence in another.

The danger is rarely ignorance. It is assumption.

Electrical systems are a prime example. A poor crimp, an inadequate ground, improper circuit protection—these errors are invisible until they are not. A bad rivet announces itself. A marginal electrical connection waits.

As Farrand advised, if you are working outside your knowledge base—especially in avionics or firewall-forward systems—bring in help. Peer review and technical counselor visits are not formalities. They are risk reduction tools. Don’t leave it to the DAR to discover what you could have caught earlier.

Quantifying “Thinking Like a Builder”

So, what does thinking like a builder really mean?

More than just a slogan, it is developed behavior, and it means understanding that modern kits reduce fabrication workload, but not necessarily cognitive workload. It means recognizing and dealing with “decision density” i.e., the steady stream of small choices that collectively determine safety.

It means resisting build-time compression near the finish line, using checklists during construction, not just during flight. It means verifying hardware before closure, inviting independent inspection before covering something permanently.

It means refusing to let “get-there-itis” infect the last ten percent of the project.

The tools are better.

The kits are better.

The documentation is better.

Human nature is unchanged.

Whether the project is a spacecraft assembled by thousands or a kitplane built in a two-car garage, the underlying risk is the same:

When decision-making degrades, the hardware eventually reflects it.

Thinking like a builder is not just about craftsmanship alone. It is about disciplined judgment—every single time you pick up a wrench.

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here